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CRMINAL PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE  
Summary 
 
 The Court considered an appeal from a district court conviction. The Court reversed the 
Eighth Judicial District Court’s judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict of burglary 
and grand larceny. The juvenile court retains jurisdiction over Barber because the legislation did 
not include language regarding jurisdiction stripping or dismissal requirements. However, the 
Court reversed the judgment because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support 
Barber’s conviction. 
 
Background 
 
 On January 21, 2009, Aldegunda Mendoza returned home to find her home ransacked 
and property missing. When a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) officer 
arrived, he quickly opined that someone had broken into the home via the master bathroom 
window. Robbie Dahn, a crime scene analyst called by the LVMPD officer, found several sets of 
fingerprints at the scene, one of which—a palm print—belonged to Appellant Barber.  
 The juvenile court issued an arrest warrant on May 12, 2009, and the State served the 
warrant the same day. Also on May 12, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging 
Barber with burglary and grand larceny. The juvenile court had not made a final disposition 
regarding the petition by August 16, 2010 when the State filed a petition to certify Barber for 
criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition for certification 
as an adult. After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Barber on both counts. 
 
Discussion 
 
A. Did the Juvenile Court Have Proper Jurisdiction? 
 Barber asserted that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him when they failed to make 
a decision regarding the State’s delinquency petition within one year of the State filing the 
petition, as prescribed by NRS § 62D.310(3).3 Because fifteen months passed before the juvenile 
court made a decision regarding the State’s certification petition, Barber contended that the 
juvenile court exercised improper jurisdiction over him. 
 Because this jurisdictional issue was a matter of first impression before the Court, this 
matter required the Court to interpret NRS § 62D.310(3). This Court reviews questions of 
statutory interpretation de novo, with a focus on the legislative intent behind the statute.4 The 
Court recognized that the “juvenile court system is a creation of statute” that possesses the 
powers granted to it by the statutes.5 Because Barber committed the alleged acts when he was 
only 17 years old, the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction over him. However, Barber contends 
that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him when it failed to comply with the one year 
requirement of NRS § 62D.310(3). The Court disagrees. 
                                                          
1  By Ronni N. Boskovich. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 62D.310(3) (2013). 
4  State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). 
5  Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93, 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980). 
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 While the language in NRS § 62D.310(3) may seem clear,6 the Court recognized that “the 
statute does not specify a remedy or sanction when the juvenile court does not comply with the 
statutory deadlines.”7 If the Legislature intended to strip jurisdiction or require dismissal, explicit 
language would normally be included in the statute. Here, the Court looked to two other state 
statutes similar to NRS § 62D.310(3), both of which included express language regarding 
dismissal.8 Furthermore, the Court noted a similar Vermont statute in which a Vermont court 
determined that the time constraints were suggestive rather than binding.9  
 Therefore, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over Barber due to the absence of 
express statutory language articulating ramifications for noncompliance. 
 
B. Did the Prosecution Present Sufficient Evidence? 
 When examining the sufficiency of evidence, the Court considers “whether, after 
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”10 Here, the 
Court considered identity evidence, specifically whether fingerprint evidence is sufficient to 
uphold a conviction for burglary. 
 The location of Barber’s palm print served as the deciding factor in this case. This Court 
has previously held that a defendant’s fingerprints on objects inside the home were sufficient to 
identify the defendant without corroborating evidence.11 However, Dahn discovered Barber’s 
palm print on the outside of the home, on the master bathroom window. In a later case, this 
Court, relying on Carr, held that a fingerprint on a window screen leaning against the house was 
sufficient evidence to support a burglary conviction.12 However, because burglary requires 
entry,13 fingerprints on the outside of the home without additional corroborating evidence are 
insufficient to support a burglary conviction. The Court thus overruled Gieger to that extent. 
 The prosecution did not introduce enough evidence during the trial to support Barber’s 
burglary conviction. The only evidence that the prosecution offered to support its theory was 
Barber’s palm print on the outside of the window, that Mendoza did not know Barber, and that 
there was no reason for Barber’s palm print to be on the window. The prosecution did not offer 
any evidence to prove that Barber actually entered the home or stole the property. Therefore, the 
limited evidence presented against Barber in this case is insufficient to support a conviction for 
burglary and grand larceny. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 62D.310(3) (2013) (“The juvenile court shall not extend the time for final disposition of a case 
beyond 1 year from the date on which the petition in the case was filed.”). 
7  Barber v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 103 at 6 (Dec. 31, 2015). 
8  Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m) (permitting dismissal); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/5-601(3) (2005) (requiring 
dismissal). 
9  In re J.V., 573 A.2d 1196,1196 (Vt. 1990). 
10  Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007). 
11  Carr v. State, 96 Nev. 936, 939, 620 P.2d 869, 871 (1980). 
12  Geiger v. State, 112 Nev. 938, 940-41, 920 P.2d 993, 995 (1996). 
13  See NEV. REV. STAT § 205.060(1) (2010). 
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 Although the juvenile court does retain jurisdiction over Barber, the Court reversed the 
judgment of conviction from the lower court because the prosecution presented insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for burglary and grand larceny. 
